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I. INTRODUCTION
Women on the average live longer than men.1 This fact is
widely used by the insurance industry in calculating costs and
benefits. The use of sex-specific characteristics, however, con-
fronts courts and legislatures with difficult questions concerning
discrimination in insurance practices.
The issue of sex discrimination is central to three cases
granted certiorari in the 1982 term of the Supreme Court: Peters
v. Wayne State University' ("Peters"), Spirt v. Teachers Insur-
ance and Annuity Association' ("Spirt"), and Norris v. Arizona
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity' ("Norris").'1
1. Life expectancy at age 65 for males increased from 11.35 years in 1900 to
14.02 years in 1980, while life expectancy at age 65 for females increased from
12.01 years to 18.35 years. Thus the sex gap in life expectancy at age 65 has
increased from .66 years to 4.33 years between 1900 and 1980. At age 65, the
widening of the sex gap in life expectancy has not stabilized during the 1970's.
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SSA Pun. No. 11-11534, LvE TABLES FOR
THE UNITED STATES, 1900-2050, (1982) [hereinafter cited as LiFE TABLES].
2. 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1982)
(No. 82-794).
3. 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1982)
(No. 82-791).
4. 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1982)
(No. 82-52).
4.1 Immediately prior to publication of this article, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Norris, 51 U.S.L.W. 5243 (U.S. June 28, 1983) (No. 82-52). The Court upheld
the Ninth Circuit's finding that Arizona's third insurance option (see infra notes 100 &
101 and accompanying text) violated Title VII by providing a privilege of employment
based on sex. The majority opinion was written by Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Stevens and O'Connor. A dissenting opinion was written by Justice
Powell, joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice
O'Connor joined the Powell opinion in part to form a majority in reversing the lower
court's igposition of retroactive application of gender-neutral annuities.
The effect of the decision is to impose gender-neutral requirements on all employer-
provided insurance initiated after the judgment date. In her opinion, Justice O'Connor
limited the application of gender neutrality by stating: "[flinally, our decision must
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In all three cases, female employees claimed that unequal retire-
ment benefits based on sex-segregated mortality tables violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids discrimi-
nation in employment.5 The appellate courts in each case relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's 1978 decision in City of Los
Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,a but dis-
agreed with its application. The Manhart Court had found that
an employer-provided retirement plan violated Title VII because
women were required to make larger monthly contributions than
men in order to receive the same monthly retirement benefits.
The larger contributions reflected the higher cost of providing
for women's greater longevity.
7
In legislative action related to sex discrimination in insur-
ance, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation favorably reported the Fair Insurance Practices Act
ignore (and our holding has no necessary effect on) the larger issue of whether considera-
tions of sex should be barred from all insurance plans, including individual purchases of
insurance, an issue that Congress is currently debating." The Court did not express an
opinion regarding the other insurance cases that were granted certiorari; however, the
effect of the Norris decision appears to make those cases moot.
5. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1976), reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
6. 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Many commentators have analyzed the Manhart decision.
See, e.g., Freed and Polsby, Privacy, Efficiency, and the Equality of Men and Women: A
Revisionist View of Sex Discrimination in Employment, 1981 A.B. FOUND. REsEA"cH J.
583; Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 A.B. FOUND. RESEARcH J. 83;
Note, The End of Sex Discrimination in Employer-Operated Pension Plans: The Chal-
lenge of the Manhart Case, 1979 DUKE L.J. 682 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DUKE L.J.];
Gold, Of Giving and Taking: Applications and Implications of City of Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 65 VA. L. RFv. 663 (1979); City of Los Ange-
les, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart: A Statutory Decision Without a Con-
stitutional Basis, 11 U. WEsT L.A. L. Rav. 83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U. WEST L.A.
L. REv.]; Brilmayer, Hekeler, Laycock & Sullivan, Sex Discrimination in Employer
Sponsored Insurance, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brilmayer]; and
Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee Fringe Benefits: Man-
hart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 489 (1982).
7. The parties in Manhart disputed neither women's greater longevity, nor the
added costs of women's retirement benefits. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707-08.
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(FIPA)Y in the fall of 1982. Whereas Title VII applies only to
discrimination in employment, FIPA would extend gender-neu-
tral requirements to all insurance. Proponents of this bill justify
its passage on civil rights principles.' As will be discussed below,
FIPA is not required to fulfill civil rights goals. Moreover, it is
contrary to basic insurance concepts which tie insurance costs to
benefits received.
Providing insurance as employee compensation falls directly
within Title VII's scope and involves considerations different
from those attending insurance offered to the private buyer on
the open market, a difference recognized in Manhart.' The
mandatory nature of employer-provided group plans" clearly
sets them apart from individually purchased policies. The Peters
and Spirt insurance plans violate Title VII by providing greater
retirement benefits to men than to women. Because these bene-
fits represent a form of deferred wages, basing these benefits on
gender constitutes discrimination in employment. The Norris
plan, however, is based upon open market principles and repre-
sents an insurance plan that is compatible with nondiscrimina-
tion goals. While congressional action may be needed to clarify
some issues that will not be resolved in current litigation, the
expansive reach of FIPA effectively undermines basic insurance
concepts and fails to meet traditional nondiscrimination goals.
This comment will first outline a few basic insurance con-
cepts and distinguish employer-provided plans from individually
purchased policies. It will then examine discrimination criteria
and Manhart's application of Title VII and apply those princi-
ples to the pending Supreme Court cases. This Comment will
8. S. 2204, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982), reintroduced in 1983 as S. 372 and H.R. 100.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
9. The Senate Report for FIPA lists groups supporting the bill, including among
others, American Civil Liberties Union, NAACP, National Organization for Women
(NOW), and National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc. S.
REP. No. 97-671, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. See
also Cohodas, Women Shift Focus on Hill to Economic Equity Issues, 41 CONG. Q. 781
(1983).
10. "Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an employer to set
aside equal retirement contributions for each employee and let each retiree purchase the
largest benefit which his or her accumulated contributions could command in the open
market." Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717-18.
11. While the phrase "group plans" will be used in this article to refer to all
employer provided plans, technically not all such plans are group insurance as defined by
state insurance laws. Under this paper's analysis, all employer provided plans are consid-
ered mandatory because an employee would have to forego compensation to refuse cover-
age. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
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also suggest that FIPA be revised to extend its gender-neutral
requirements only to employer provided group plans.
II. INSURANCE CONCEPTS
A. Assignment of Risks
Insurance represents a present purchase by the insured to
protect against a future risk. The insurer seeks to collect premi-
ums to match the risks assumed, and, to the extent possible, col-
lect from the insured only the amount necessary to cover each
individual risk." A death benefits insures against the risk of
early death and the consequent financial hardship to the
insured's dependents. The person with a high probability of
early death would pay more for this type of policy than would a
person with an anticipated long life. A lifetime annuity,14 on the
other hand, insures against longevity-the risk that an individ-
ual will outlive his savings. Consequently, the person with a high
probability of long life would pay more for an annuity, and the
person likely to die early would pay less.' 5
Both the insured and the insurer engage in a process of
selection. 16 The insured bases his insurance purchase on his best
12. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Council of Life Insurance at 7, Norris v. Ari-
zona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982) [herein-
after referred to as Insurance Council Brief].
13. A death benefit (commonly referred to as life insurance) is a contract to pay a
designated amount to the beneficiary on the death of the insured, 1 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 1:69 (2d ed. 1959).
14. An annuity typically is the payment to the recipient of a specified monthly sum,
and is frequently used for retirement income.
The pure form of single life annuity, usually referred to as "straight life annu-
ity," provides periodic, usually monthly, income payments that continue as
long as the annuitant lives and terminates upon his death. The annuity is con-
sidered fully liquidated upon the death of the annuitant, and no guarantee is
given that any particular number of monthly payments will be made. Because
of the absence of any benefit after death, this type of single life annuity pro-
vides the largest monthly income per dollar of purchase price outlay.
D. McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 122 (1979). A legislative prohibition
against use of gender distinct tables (e.g., FIPA) would affect all forms of insurance,
including disability and automobile. This article, however, is limited to a discussion of
death benefits and annuities, the issues in the cases before the Court.
15. Brief of Teachers Insurance Annuity Association (TIAA) and College Retire-
ment Equities Fund (CREF) as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4-6, Norris v.
Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982).
16. Selection refers to an exercise of choice by the insured and the insurer based on
self-interest. Compare the lack of selectivity by the insured in group plans to this
description by an actuary:
[Slelection is performed by different persons in life insurance, from what it is
[Vol. 7:137
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estimate of life expectancy, his personal needs, and the cost to
him. The insurer relies on the characteristics of the insured and
on statistical probabilities to determine the risk. Each tries to
win a competitive advantage by outguessing the other. In
mandatory group plans, individual selection does not exist. The
insurer accepts all covered risks regardless of classification and
the individual gains coverage regardless of personal classification
or need.17
B. Classification of Risks
In writing an individual policy, an insurer can consider a
number of factors affecting mortality such as health, family his-
tory, and sports activities.18 The premiums charged to the
in annuity insurance. In both instances there is selection (trying to outguess
the other party) by both the insured and the insurer. In life insurance, the risk
being borne by the insurer is the risk of early death. The insurer, then, must
guard against the insured's having knowledge the insurer does not have, i.e.
knowledge that he has not been feeling well, that he has a certain disease, that
his family history indicates a certain disease, that he sky dives on Sundays, i.e.
knowledge that will put him in a special "extra cost" class. So these character-
istics, along with age and sex, are information the insurer needs to know to
classify the risk properly. In life insurance, then, selection is done by the
insurer ...
Why, then, are not these questions of health, occupation, avocation, etc. as
well as the questions on age and sex asked when an annuity is issued? If a
person knows he or she has a higher probability of dying because of any of the
elements-health, occupation, family history, avocation-would he or she not
be unwise to buy an annuity which pays only for long life, not short life? In the
case of an annuity then, self-selection is done by the insured (annuitant) in
advance for all the elements except age and sex. Hence those are the only
questions that need to be asked by the insurer.
Lautzenheiser, Sex and the Single Table: Equal Monthly Retirement Income for the
Sexes? 2 EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J. 8 (Fall 1976).
17. It is the broadness of the group covered and the generally mandatory nature of
group plans that makes them financially feasible. The risks are pooled over a large popu-
lation which can exercise little adverse selection. See infra notes 26-31 and accompany-
ing text, explaining adverse selection. "The design of a risk classification system is
affected by the degree to which the insurance program is compulsory or voluntary. For
programs which are largely or entirely compulsory and where there is no voluntary
choice among competing institutions, broad classifications are sometimes used, the
extreme being a single class." AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, RISK CLASSIFICATION
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1, 12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as RISK CLASSIFICATION].
18. The grouping of risks with similar risk characteristics for the purpose of
setting prices is a fundamental precept of any workable private, voluntary
insurance system. This process, called risk classification, is necessary to main-
tain a financially sound and equitable system. It enables the development of
equitable insurance prices, which in turn assures the availability of needed cov-
erage to the public. This is achieved through the grouping of risks to determine
averages and the application of these averages to individuals. . ..
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insured reflect each factor's effect on probability of long life for
that individual. In group policies, however, isolating individual
characteristics has not been economical, particularly since it
would require continual monitoring of the groups. Some factors
are sufficiently reliable and easily determined so that taking
them into account is economically significant. 19 Age2" and sex,
for example, are two of the most accurate predictors of longev-
ity.21 The correlation is clear and acknowledged. 22 Unlike factors
such as marriage, smoking, and health habits,23 these character-
Determining average experience for a particular class of risk is not the
same as predicting the experience for an individual risk in the class. It is
both impossible and unnecessary to predict experience for individual
risks. If the occurrence, timing and magnitude of an event were known in
advance, there would be no economic uncertainty and therefore no reason
for insurance.
RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note 17, at 1.
19. Freed and Polsby, supra note 6, at 625.
20. The law specifically exempts age consideration in insurance from equal pay
requirements. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-24 (1976), provides in part:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organi-
zation. . . (2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan,
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no
such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.
Id. § 623 (f) (emphasis added). But at least one commentator has questioned the distinc-
tion between age and sex:
A man who retires at age sixty, with a given dollar accumulation, will ordina-
rily receive a smaller (periodic) pension benefit than a man who retires at age
seventy. If one cannot consider the greater life expectancy of the average sixty-
five year old woman as compared to the average sixty-five year old man, can
periodic benefits be based upon the greater life expectancy of the average
sixty-year old man as compared to the average seventy-year old man? Cer-
tainly, some retirees at age sixty will have fewer post-retirement years than
seventy year old retirees ...
DuKE L.J., supra note 6, at 702 (quoting from Halperin and Gross, Sex Discrimination
and Pensions: Are We Moving Toward Unisex Tables? 30 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 235,
249-50 (1977)).
21. Kimball, supra note 6, at 118-20. See Kimball at 109 for an explanation of the
methods used in developing female mortality tables.
22. Id. at 118-20.
23. The Manhart Court noted factors other than sex which could contribute to lon-
gevity: "Other social causes, such as drinking or eating habits-perhaps even the linger-
ing effects of past employment discrimination-may also affect the mortality differen-
tial." 435 U.S. at 710 n.17 (citing R. RETHERFORD, THE CHANGING SEx DIFFERENTIAL IN
MORTALITY 71-82 93 (1975)). "A study of life expectancy in the United States for 1949-
1951 showed that 20-year-old men could expect to live to 60.6 years of age if they were
divorced. If married, they could expect to reach 70.9 years of age, a difference of more
than 0years." 435 U.S. at 710 n.18 (citing R. RETHERFORD, THE CHANGING SEX DIFFER-
ENTIAL IN MORTALITY 93 (1975)).
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istics are immutable.2 4 Therefore, group plans universally base




Classification of risks can be justified on the basis of fair-
ness; that is, that the young should not subsidize the old, nor
should the healthy subsidize the sickly. But the insurance indus-
try goal of tailoring individual premiums to risks is largely dic-
tated by economics. Were an insurer to charge all his death ben-
efit policy holders the same premiums regardless of age, adverse
selection would likely force the company out of business.2 6
Adverse selection refers to the assumption that insurance, like
any commodity, will respond to the economic forces of the mar-
ket place where self-interest motivates individual purchases. In a
competitive market, younger men are unlikely to purchase insur-
ance from a company that bases premiums on the average life
expectancy of all policy holders. Older men, however, would be
attracted to the company's bargain rates. The average age would
increase, along with the premiums, and cause more young and
middle aged men to avoid the company. As the process contin-
ues, the company ultimately becomes unable to attract new pol-
icy holders. In this manner, adverse selection, occurring when-
ever options are available to an individual, distorts the basis for
any group premium rate.
24. "The use of age and sex also commends itself to insurers in another way: both
factors are hard to lie about and easy to check up on. On the other hand, the insured has
every incentive to lie about whether she is or is not a smoker, goes in for or does not go
in for helmetless motorcross, is or is not an obsessive-compulsive ('Type A') personality,
worships or does not worship God by handling snakes." Freed and Polsby, supra note 6,
at 625 (footnote omitted).
25. Age is the singular most prevalent basis for calculating insurance rates. An
example of its use by the industry illustrates the need for classification. A man of 25 is
expected to live on the average an additional 47 years. Under existing level-premium
whole life plans, the premium charged to him would be fairly low. The insurer antici-
pates that the insured's payments to the company, plus interest earned, will cover the
payment to his survivors at age 72, his average expected age of death. He may, of course,
die the day after paying his first premium, and the insurer would be liable for the face
amount of the policy. The mortality table for 25 year-old males reflects the rareness of
this occurrence. The insurance company collects sufficient funds from all other 25 year-
old males carrying life insurance to spread the cost of this minor risk. Without this age
distinction, a 25 year-old male with a 47 year life expectancy would pay the same pre-
mium as a 75 year-old male with a 9 year life expectancy. (Figures derived from LIFE
TABLEs, supra note 1, at 62-63).
26. Insurance Council Brief, supra note 12, at 8-11.
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Adverse selection also applies to gender based annuity
options. Consider an employer that contracts with an insurer to
provide an annuity plan with cashout options2 7 which differ by
gender, but are actuarially equivalent28  to the annuities.29
Because of this equivalence, the insurer need not be concerned
about the proportion of male to female employees who cash out
their annuities. If gender-neutral cashout option factors are
imposed, 0 the balance is upset. In that case a man could benefit
by taking the lump sum and investing in a private retirement
policy that would offer the advantage of gender based tables.
Conversely, a woman gains an advantage in drawing an annuity
from the group plan. The higher costs of funding gender-neutral
cashout options for men combined with the all female annuities
increases the overall cost of the group plan.31
III. TITLE VII AND MANHART
A. Title VII Discrimination
Classifying individuals on the basis of group characteristics
is the essence of unlawful discrimination.32 Yet classifying indi-
27. Some plans allow the insured the option of taking a lump sum on retirement.
"Most plans that permit a full withdrawal of the actuarial value of the accrued benefits
attempt to protect themselves against adverse selection [by those anticipating a short
life] by requiring the participant to elect the cash option some years in advance of retire-
ment." D. McGmL, supra note 14, at 128 n.10.
28. Actuarial value approximates current market value, based on specified assump-
tions. Actuarial equivalents are payments of similar value. Final Report of Actuaries'
Committee on Pension Terminology, PENS. REP. (BNA) No. 353, at R-2 to R-5 (Aug. 3,
1981).
29. The cash value of a woman's annuity would be approximately 15% more than a
man's, based on her longer life expectancy. In Manhart, women's contributions were
14.84% higher than men's. 435 U.S. at 705.
30. Gender-neutral factors would provide equal cashouts for equal monthly pay-
ments, regardless of the sex of the annuitant.
31. This example hypothesizes the imposition of gender-neutral factors on existing
contracts, much as proposed legislation (FIPA) would do. Such legislation would affect
future contracts in a different way. Presumably the insurer would anticipate that most
men would cash out their annuities and that most women would not. The legislation
would not adversely affect insurers of future contracts, but would effectively limit the
choice of future employees. See also Kimball, supra note 6, at 134-35.
32. The Supreme Court has found gender discrimination illegal under both Title
VII and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Manhart,
435 U.S. 700 (1978) (Title VII violation); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (declaring a
state law which authorized courts to impose alimony obligations on husbands but not
wives unconstitutional). Title VII, by its terms, forbids employment discrimination
based on race, color, sex, or national origin. Title VII applies to both private and govern-
mental employers. The Constitution is binding only on governmental actions, but goes
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viduals on the basis of group characteristics is an essential tool
of the insurance industry.33 While it is possible to test individu-
als for job skills, one cannot forecast when an individual will
die.8 4 The insurance industry's necessary reliance on past group
experience to predict future events complicates the application
of discrimination criteria.
The Supreme Court has found gender classifications dis-
criminatory under Title VII35 on the basis of the stigma that
attaches to such classifications."0 The Court's rationale for
finding discrimination, however, does not logically apply to
insurance. Women are not stigmatized by an assumption that
beyond the scope of employment. Although the Court has indicated that the standards
are not identical for statutory and constitutional violations, Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 247 (1976), the reasoning closely parallels in both types of cases. Noting that
Congress has not defined "discrimination" for Title VII purposes, the Court has relied on
its experience in interpreting the equal protection clause: "[T]hose cases afford an
existing body of law analyzing and discussing that term in a legal context not wholly
dissimilar to the concerns which Congress manifested in enacting Title VII." General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976). Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) probably presents the most current and complete expression of the
Court's reasoning in constitutional discrimination cases. The Court cited Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976) as requiring a higher level of judicial scrutiny for classifications by
gender. "Classifications based on gender, not unlike those based upon race, have tradi-
tionally been the touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination." (citations
omitted) Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273.
33. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
34. Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Manhart, recognized the inher-
ent dilemma: "Unlike the possibility, for example, of properly testing job applicants for
qualifications before employment, there is simply no way to determine in advance when
a particular employee will die." 435 U.S. at 724.
35. The Manhart Court found that "trea tment of a person in a manner which but
for that person's sex would be different" violated Title VII. 435 U.S. at 711. "Even a true
generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to
whom the generalization does not apply." Id. at 708. See also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136 (1977) (finding Title VII discrimination in employer's policy regarding preg-
nancy leaves).
36. Manhart quoted from Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971) in its Title VII analysis:
In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. Section 703(a)(1) subjects to
scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities and
enjoyment which have plagued women in the past.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the
Court held that the armed services practice of treating female dependents differently
than male dependents violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
"[I]n part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face perva-
sive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the
job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena." (footnote omitted)
Id. at 686.
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they will live a greater number of years than men. The attribu-
tion of long life neither perpetuates past stereotypes nor ham-
pers women in attaining full access to jobs and education."
Although the Court frequently determines unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of an immutable characteristic such as sex,"5 in
an insurance context the immutable characteristic is not being
used to oppress women. To the contrary, gender classification
provides both a burden and benefit. For example, women pay
more than men for annuities, but less for life insurance, because
of their greater longevity.
The insurance industry must be able to rely on some group
classifications even though any classification will inevitably dis-
advantage some group on the basis of its past history. It is true
that insurance distinctions can be limited to such factors as
whether the insured is married or unmarried, 9 fat or thin, or
sick or healthy. From an insurance standpoint, some health clas-
sifications are as immutable as sex and may be considered as
unfairly discriminatory.40 If one accepts the premise that fair-
ness means matching premiums to individual risks, then all fac-
tors are legitimate predictors. Since there is no absolute test for
life expectancy, a prediction will be more accurate when consid-
eration is given to as many individual characteristics as are fea-
sible. The matching of premiums to risks will be more individu-
alized 41 when sex is one of the predictive factors.
37. See supra note 36.
38. Footnote number four in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
(1936) referring to "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities" has formed the
basis for heightened scrutiny of governmental classifications based on immutable charac-
teristics. Id. at 153 n.4. See L. TRm, AMERICAN CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 1090 (1978). One
commentator lists three characteristics common to race, color, sex, religion, and national
origin which argue against their use under Title VII: first, "ascriptive" and "immutable,"
meaning characteristics over which the individual has no control; second, characteristics
that "have been widely misused throughout history;" and third, characteristics that "are
generally irrelevant to employment decisions." Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 526-27. But
see Kimball, supra note 6, at 103-05, discussing "fair" and "unfair" discrimination.
39. See supra note 23 (other criteria suggested in Manhart).
40. See analysis of FIPA, infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
41. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Manhart made this argument: "Individually,
every woman has the same statistical possibility of outliving men. This is the essence of
basing decisions on reliable statistics when individual determinations are infeasible or, as
here, impossible." 435 U.S. at 728. The Chief Justice was arguing in the context of a
mandatory group policy.
[Vol. 7:137
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B. Title VII Application in Manhart
Gender should be an allowable factor for determining pre-
miums and benefits for individually purchased policies. Because
of the lack of selection in employer-provided group plans, how-
ever, gender distinctions in such plans are unfairly discrimina-
tory. Under this criteria, the Court correctly decided Manhart.
Therein the Court found "no reason to believe Congress
intended a special definition of discrimination in the context of
group insurance coverage. '42
In Manhart, the Court held that an employer's mandatory
pension plan violated Title VII by withholding larger contribu-
tions from women than from men. The women paid 14.84%
more than men in monthly contributions to receive the same
monthly benefit at retirement. The higher costs reflected
women's longer life expectancies. 4 The Court reasoned that
women's higher contribution rates decreased their take-home
pay in relation to men, thus discriminating against women in
terms of compensation.
The Court found that the Manhart plan violated Title VII
on the basis of disparate treatment"-an intentional dis-
advantaging of every individual in the class on the basis of sex.
The Court relied on Title VII's emphasis on the individual to
42. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710.
43. "It involves a generalization that the parties accept as unquestionably true:
Women, as a class, do live longer than men. The Department treated its women employ-
ees differently from its men employees because the two classes are in fact different."
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707-08.
44. Title VII discrimination is based on two theories-disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact. The difference between the two hinges on intent or lack of intent.
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people
less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situa-
tions be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). See also McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (setting forth burdens of proof reiterated by the
Court in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)).
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress
"disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof
of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-
impact theory.
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15 (citations omitted). See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252
n.5 (recognizing discriminatory effect on protected classes and suggesting the distinction
between disparate impact and disparate treatment).
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reject the argument that fairness to the entire class could offset
discrimination against the individual.45 Under a system of gen-
der-neutral contributions, men as a group would receive fewer
annuity payments because of their shorter lifespans, although
men and women contributed equal amounts. 46 The Court, how-
ever, denied the Water Department's defense that men were
thus illegally discriminated against.47
In disallowing the Department's contention that equal con-
tributions would discriminate against males, the Court found
that "each retiree's total pension benefits are ultimately deter-
mined by his actual life span. "48 Thus, while sex may be an
45. The Court's reasoning can be analyzed in terms of disparate treatment versus
disparate impact analysis. Brilmayer, supra note 6, argues that Congress's intent in pas-
sage of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Bennett Amendment (see infra note 48)
was to assure individual rather than group protection:
Equal periodic annuity benefits are not illegal discrimination against men, for
the amendment permits disparate impact on either sex in compensation. If it
happens that men as a group collect less than women as a group, the difference
is due to some "factor other than sex," namely, actual longevity. Just as men
as a group may get higher wages if they have greater average seniority, women
as a group may collect higher total pension benefits if more of them live longer.
Id. at 520 (citations omitted). But see U. WEsT L.A. L. REv., supra note 6 (asserting that
Manhart should have been decided under a disparate impact analysis, rather than dispa-
rate treatment).
46. It is interesting to note that in Manhart the Court recognized that the Depart-
ment provided life insurance to all employees without distinction as to sex, but the Court
did not say whether this factor influenced its decision. Gender neutral life insurance is
one area where women subsidize men. 435 U.S. at 710, n.19.
47. Two commentators criticized the Manhart assumption that equality of compen-
sation should require access to equal monthly annuity benefits. Kimball, supra note 6,
contends equality under Title VII can be defined as equal employer contributions. Ben-
ston, supra note 6, agrees with Kimball's basic analysis, but in a more complex formula-
tion, insists equal compensation means equal market value. This is the same conclusion
reached by the Sixth Circuit in Peters. See infra text accompanying note 86. Benston
also asserts that where sex is used as a predictor of longevity in calculating costs, it
would be discriminatory not to use sex as a predictor in calculating benefits. He recog-
nizes that it is not efficient to take into account factors other than sex and age, but that
the management savings which result from the use of these two factors benefit all
insureds by producing lower cost insurance than would be available on the individual
market. He concludes that this cost advantage justifies the gender distinction.
48. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710 n.20. The Court rejected defense contentions that the
Bennett Amendment exempted the use of sex-segregated tables as a "factor other than
sex," but found actual longevity was such a factor:
A variation on the Department's fairness theme is the suggestion that a gen-
der-neutral pension plan itself violates Title VII because of its disproportion-
ately heavy impact on male employees. This suggestion has no force in the sex
discrimination context because each retiree's total pension benefits are ulti-
mately determined by his actual life span; any differential in benefits paid to
men and women in the aggregate is thus "based on [a] factor other than sex,"
and consequently immune from challenge under the Equal Pay Act.
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accurate predictor of group life expectancy, an individual's
death cannot be predicted from group statistics. Therefore, it
cannot be said that any individual man will receive less in com-
pensation any more certainly than any individual woman will
receive more.4
The Manhart Court recognized a legal distinction between
employer-provided group insurance and the private market. The
Court specifically exempted from Title VII a plan that would
provide men and women employees with equal funds to
purchase insurance on the open market.50 The Court implicitly
acknowledged that in a mandatory employer-provided group
plan the employee is a captive consumer, and that the "better
risks always subsidize the poorer risks. '5 1  Although an
employer's contribution to a benefit plan may be fairly charac-
435 U.S. at 710 n.20 (citations omitted).
To understand the Court's reasoning, it is necessary to read Title VII in conjunction
with the Bennett Amendment and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Bennett Amend-
ment became part of Title VII, § 703(h), which provides in part:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of
the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if
such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title
29.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (The Equal Pay Act) provides, in
part:
No employer. . . shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex
. ..except where such payment is made pursuant to. . . (i) a seniority sys-
tem; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other
than sex ...
U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
49. This concept may be explained by a hypothetical situation: An employer who
provides on-the-job meals to his employees might find that males eat 30% more than
females. The employer might consider it more efficient to predict the amount of food
needed on the basis of the ratio of males to females in the workforce, rather than try to
anticipate how much each individual eats. This does not mean that each male will eat
more than each female. Some women may have hearty appetites, and some men may be
watching their weight. No one is being discriminated against on the basis of sex. Each
employee has equal access to the food; each eats according to individual preference. The
group trait is merely being used to forecast the amount of food needed. Extending this
analogy to conditions represented in group insurance plans based on gender, it would be
discriminatory to the individual to deduct the 30% greater food costs from each male's
salary on the basis (no matter how accurate) of the group trait.
50. See supra note 10.
51. 435 U.S. at 710. Gold, supra note 6, expresses the policy inherent in the Court's
decision: "If as a result of this rule (Manhart] men have to subsidize women, [in the
purchase of annuities] as blacks already subsidize whites and single persons now subsi-
dize married persons, that is a policy judgment that Congress has reached." Id. at 687.
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terized as deferred wages, 2 the employee has little choice in how
these wages will be spent.5 3 However, the insurer provides cover-
age automatically without imposing selective devices (such as
physical examinations for life insurance). In other words, a
healthy person with no dependents might not want death bene-
fits, but might prefer an annuity because of expected longevity.
Under a typical employer plan, the insured could not opt out of
the death benefit coverage and receive the difference in
increased wages. In many plans no cash option is available, and
an employee is provided an annuity whether or not he desires
it.54
This lack of selectivity distinguishes employer-provided
group plans from individually purchased insurance. In
mandatory group plans, the insured trades an opportunity to
make choices for the greater bargain provided by a group plan's
economy of scale. Additionally, the insured is granted coverage
regardless of individual habits or characteristics, and retains
coverage despite any adverse changes in those habits or charac-
teristics. The insurer, in turn, trades selection criteria for a sta-
ble group of premium payers who cannot exercise adverse selec-
tion. Compulsory membership provides the insurer with a broad
pool of risks where the deaths will average out. In the open mar-
ket, on the other hand, the individual lacks the security and eco-
nomic advantages of group coverage, but is able to purchase
insurance tailored to personal needs. The cost of that insurance
also will reflect individual risk characteristics.
Because of administrative convenience, only age and sex are
used to calculate benefits in a group plan. Under Manhart's
interpretation of Title VII, administrative convenience does not
justify classification on the basis of sex. When employee com-
pensation is given in the form of insurance without an opportu-
52. See generally D. McGILL supra note 14, at 16-21.
53. See supra note 10.
54. The plans in Spirt and Peters did not offer a cashout option. In a case involving
the same type of annuity at issue in Spirt and Peters, Judge Coffin expressed this con-
cept in his concurring opinion:
The plan that is before us, as I see it, fails because it is as if a company paid its
male and female employees equal salaries, but in the form of chits that could
be redeemed only in a particular store which, the company knew, would give to
one sex more for the same number of chits than to the other sex. That com-
pany could hardly claim that it was not discriminating between men and
women.
EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139, 1146 (1st Cir. 1978) (Coffin, J., concurring).
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nity to select the coverage desired or purchase a contract based
on individual characteristics, benefits should be gender-neutral.
In the purchase of individual policies, however, Manhart's open
market concept should prevail. Insurers must rely on classifica-
tions to predict future events. Stereotyping is justified as an
attempt at individualization on the only basis possible. The nar-
rower the risk classifications are drawn, the more closely they
will approximate actual experience.15 Since an insurer cannot
know a particular woman's life expectancy, it will come closest
to matching her premiums to her risk if it bases her premiums
on women's life expectancy, rather than the combined life
expectancy of men and women. Women will profit in some areas
and pay more in others, but individuals should be free to negoti-
ate for coverage on any mutually agreeable basis.
C. Issues Remaining After Manhart
The line between individual coverage and employer-pro-
vided benefits is not always clear. Although Manhart held
retirement benefits in general to be "compensation" under Title
VII,"' the Court narrowed its decision to the plan before it.5 7
Left unresolved was the question whether all employer-provided
schemes, including cashouts, joint and survivor options," and
defined contribution plans,5 9 must be gender-neutral.
The Court's "open market" concept could imply that
cashout options should be gender-neutral, giving men and
55. Competition encourages insurers to determine and use only accurate predictors.
"To be more successful than its competitors would motivate an insurer to become more
refined in its risk classification system and thus its pricing structure, so that it could
serve both lower cost and higher cost risks in the marketplace." RISK CLASSIFICATION,
supra note 17, at 10. See also Benston, supra note 6, at 529-31.
56. "We need not decide whether retirement benefits or contributions to benefit
plans are 'wages' under the Act, because the Bennett Amendment extends the Act's four
exceptions to all forms of 'compensation' covered by Title VII." 435 U.S. at 712 n.23
(citations omitted). See supra note 48, explaining Bennett Amendment.
57. "All that is at issue today is a requirement that men and women make unequal
contributions to an employer-operated pension fund." 435 U.S. at 717.
58. A joint and survivor option is a type of annuity which "provides periodic pay-
ments as long as either of two persons shall live. For most combinations of ages, this is
the most expensive of all annuity forms. This type of contract is primarily designed to
provide old-age income to a husband and wife." D. McGnLL, supra note 14, at 123. See
Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement System, 2 EBC 2423 (C.D. Cal. 1982). In this case,
the District Court found that a system that paid male retirees who chose a joint and
survivor annuity less than female retirees was in violation of Title VII.
59. The plans at issue in Spirt and Peters are defined contribution plans. See infra
text accompanying note 71.
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women equal dollar amounts with which to purchase an annuity.
Alternatively, Manhart could be interpreted to require that men
and women receive lump sum settlements of equal actuarial
value. 0 Either basis has pitfalls. Equal sums not only invite
adverse selection, but also disadvantage women in the market
place,"' where equal dollars buy a smaller annuity for women.
The problem of adverse selection could be solved by adjusting
cashouts to reflect the actuarial value of a retiring employee's
pension rights.2 With her higher cashout, a woman could then
purchase an annuity of the same value as a man's. However, it is
difficult to see how this alternative would square with Title VII
and the Court's emphasis in Manhart on equal compensation to
the individual. Individual men would receive lower benefits in
this option. This distinction in benefits would not be based on
actual life span, but would be based on sex, a distinction prohib-
ited by Manhart6 5
Yet another approach to the problem of adverse selection
would be to reduce or eliminate cashout options, but this pre-
vents employee choice.6 Regulation of the entire industry,
requiring unisex tables for all insurance, would also reach these
problems. FIPA66 would do exactly that, extending Title VII
antidiscrimination principles to all insurance. This problem,
however, does not justify such a far-reaching congressional
remedy.
While some incentives to adverse selection in options exist,
there are countervailing disincentives. One courts' noted that
economies of scale in group plans largely offset possible advan-
60. See supra note 28.
61. See Gold, supra note 6 (contending that women would be discriminated against
when seeking employment because of their higher pension costs, and that application of
the "open market" to cashouts would further disadvantage women). See also Gold, at
683 n.58, 705 n.117 (describing an unpublished paper by William Frey).
62. Gold, supra note 6, at 707-09.
63. See supra note 48.
64. The basic issue is whether a pension plan is to be regarded as a general
savings program with all the flexibility that one would want in such a program
or as an instrument of business and social policy designed to ensure a dependa-
ble source of income throughout the remaining lifetime of retired workers.
D. McGILL, supra note 14, at 128. Congress considered and rejected legislation which
would have prohibited cashout options. Id. at 128.
65. Frey, cited in Gold, supra note 61, at 705-06, n.117, recommending regulation of
the entire industry, or alternatively a tax-supported national program replacing private
insurance plans.
66. S. 2204, supra note 8. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
67. Spirt, 691 F.2d 1054.
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tages in individually purchased plans e8 That court further noted
that the majority of men opt for joint-survivor coverage, thus
equalizing their benefits." Perhaps most telling is the fact that
the majority of private businesses now provide their employees
with gender-neutral insurance plans. 0 If experience indicates a
serious adverse selection problem, an employer can make reten-
tion of annuities more attractive by reducing the cashout value,
or cashouts can be eliminated. When insurance is a form of
employee compensation, with no -opportunity for selection on
the basis of individual characteristics, there should be no sex
differentiation in options.
As well as leaving open the question whether Title VII
would extend gender neutrality to options, the Court gave no
guidance as to whether defined contribution" plans require the
same neutrality. The plan at issue in Manhart was a defined
benefit plan wherein a beneficiary is assured of a specific
monthly income upon retirement. The contribution rate varies
according to the amount necessary to fund the plan. In a defined
contribution plan, the employer agrees to contribute a fixed
amount to the plan. Monthly benefits it retirement vary on the
basis of accumulated contributions.
IV. PENDING CASES
The questions raised in Peters7 2 Spirt8 and Norris74 are
68. Id. at 1069.
69. Id. at 1069. Generally, joint and survivor options involve husband and wife; their
combined life expectancies, therefore, average male and female risks.
70. Most private businesses use a defined benefit plan without any employee contri-
bution. For the majority of plans, there is no distinction in the amount of employee
benefits paid to males and females. "Under a defined benefit plan, male and female
employees accrue pension benefits on the same basis, and the employer absorbs the addi-
tional cost associated with female annuitants." D. McGni., supra note 14, at 99. How-
ever, this may not be true where options are involved. Different conversion rates are
often used for male and female joint and survivor annuities, and cashout rates. Id. at
125. Pension plans in which only the employer contributes are defined as "non-contribu-
tory." The majority of plans in the United States now fall in this category. In public
employee plans, however, the reverse is true: "[Olver 90 percent of the members of pub-
lic employee retirement systems are required to make contributions." T. BLEAKNEY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 26 (1972).
71. See Gold, supra note 6, at 673-76 (asserting that a defined contribution plan is
actuarially the same as a defined benefit plan and should thus be based on unisex
tables).
72. Peters v. Wayne State University, 691 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51
U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1982) (No. 82-794).
73. Spirt v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
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the inevitable outgrowth of Manhart. The Manhart decision was
limited to "employer operated pension funds" that require "une-
qual contributions from men and women. '7 5 The Court did not
address plans which pay employees unequal benefits (defined
contribution plans) as do Peters and Spirt. Norris tests Man-
hart's open market exception.
The appellate courts in Peters and Spirt faced nearly iden-
tical fact situations, yet came to opposite conclusions. Both cases
involved universities-Wayne State University was the original
defendant in Peters; Long Island University was added as a
defendant in Spirt.7 ' Both schools cooperate7 with Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA), and a companion
corporation, College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), to pro-
vide retirement benefits to their employees.7 8 A major feature of
TIAA-CREF plans is that contributions vest immediately and
irrevocably in the individual employee, allowing complete porta-
bility.79 Both TIAA and CREF use sex-segregated mortality
tables to calculate benefit rates. In Peters, the court found that
their use created pensions of equal actuarial value, and therefore
did not violate Title VII. The Spirt court, however, found the
use of sex-segregated tables reduced compensation to individual
women, and was thus discriminatory under Manhart.
The plan offered by Wayne State in Peters was unusual in
that it allowed voluntary participation by employees. Participat-
ing employees contributed 5% of their salaries. For such
employees the University contributed 10%.180 The court distin-
guished Peters from Manhart because in the latter case the
employer managed the plan and determined the disbursement
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3427 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1982) (No. 82-791).
74. Norris v. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity, 671 F.2d 330 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1982) (No. 82-52).
75. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 717.
76. The District Court found that the university was an "active participant" and
joinder was required. Spirt v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n, 416 F.Supp. 1019, 1022
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
77. TIAA-CREF contracts directly with employees. Spirt, 416 F.Supp. at 1021.
78. "TIAA and CREF manage retirement plans for faculty and staff members at
85% of all private four-year colleges and universities and over 40% of all public colleges
and universities in the United States." Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1057.
79. Portability allows an employee to transfer accumulated benefits when accepting
employment at another college or university utilizing the TIAA-CREF system.
80. It is a basic assumption of this Comment that a plan is not voluntary when it
represents part of an employee's compensation. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying
text.
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rate. s" The Peters court noted that Wayne State had no control
over disbursements and, in fact, had "repeatedly and unsuccess-
fully attempted to persuade Teachers Annuity to alter its pay-
ment policy."' 2
In reversing the lower court's finding of liability for Wayne
State, the Court of Appeals concluded that Wayne State's
actions did not violate Title VII under either a disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact analysis.8 3 The court found that
Wayne State had rebutted a "prima facie showing of disparate
treatment by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for treating female and male annuitants differently. 8 " Because
women live longer than men, their retirement benefits are of
equal value to men's, and TIAA-CREF had followed accepted
actuarial principles in calculating benefits. Nor did the court
find any intent to disadvantage women, thus dismissing a pre-
text theory of disparate treatment.8 5
The court also dismissed a claim of disparate impact,
emphasizing factual differences between the instant case and
Manhart. It concluded that men and women receive equal com-
pensation and neither group is disadvantaged in its receipt of
benefits. Because employee contributions were equal, take-home
pay was the same for men and women, and their benefit values
were actuarially equivalent.8 a
The Peters court's reasoning cannot stand with Manhart.
The only real distinction between Peters and Manhart relates to
a defined benefit plan as contrasted with a defined contribution
plan. In Peters, women contributed the same percentage of their
salaries as men, but received smaller monthly benefits when they
retired. In Manhart, women contributed larger monthly sums
than their male coworkers, but received the same benefits when
they retired. The Manhart Court acknowledged that the cost of
a woman's pension was greater because women live longer, but
held that the greater actuarial value did not justify the greater
81. The court observed that if TIAA-CREF's use of sex-segregated mortality tables
were discriminatory, Wayne State would be liable for selecting them to serve its employ-
ees, so this factual distinction is not relevant. Peters, 691 F.2d at 240.
82. Peters, 691 F.2d at 238.
83. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
84. Peters, 691 F.2d at 239.
85. Id. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981) (describing pretext for discrimination).
86. See both Benston and Kimball, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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charge to women. 7 This reasoning is completely opposite to that
used in Peters.
The Spirt Court recognized the Manhart rationale. The
plan in Spirt was "mandatory for most eligible employees."88
Under this plan, both Long Island University and each employee
contributed a set percentage of each employee's yearly earnings
to the fund. Benefits were based on sex-segregated mortality
tables, resulting in monthly payments approximately 11.3%
greater to men than to similarly situated women under the sin-
gle life option.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court's finding of a violation of Title VII." It determined that
there was no legal distinction between defined contribution and
defined benefit plans:
In fact, it would seem that if there is any meaningful distinc-
tion between the two types of sex-based plans, it is the TIAA-
CREF type of unequal benefit plan that is more in conflict
with the spirit and purposes of Title VII. Each female TIAA-
CREF plan participant is maintained at a lower economic level
than her male counterparts for as long or short a time as she is
alive to receive benefits, regardless of whether she is ultimately
one of the few who outlives the average male participant or is
one of the 84% of all women who do not outlive their male
counterparts (citations omitted).90
The Spirt court emphasized Manhart's mandate that Title
VII requires fairness to individuals, rather than classes."' In
87. In essence, the Department is arguing that the prima facie showing of dis-
crimination based on evidence of different contributions for the respective
sexes is rebutted by its demonstration that there is a like difference in the cost
of providing benefits for the respective classes. That argument might prevail if
Title VII contained a cost justification defense comparable to the affirmative
defense available in a price discrimination suit. But neither Congress nor the
courts have recognized such a defense under Title VII.
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17 (citations omitted).
88. Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1057.
89. The court also agreed with the lower court that TIAA and CREF "are so closely
intertwined" with LIU that they are considered employers for purposes of Title VII.
Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1063.
90. Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1061. The fact that between 84% and 85% of women do not
outlive men is referred to as "overlap." A similar overlap would occur in a statistical
profile comparing males of 60 with males of 65 because not all 60 year-olds outlive all 65
year-olds. See Kimball, supra note 6, at 120-23. See also infra notes 108-10 and accom-
panying text.
91. "[T]he clear mandate is that compensation, conditions and benefits of employ-
ment are to be tested by their disparate effect on individuals rather than groups." Spirt,
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rejecting the argument that equalizing benefits would constitute
unfairness to men, the court explained that the risk of longevity
was simply being spread across the entire group "rather than
being imposed on one sub-group." 2 The court found further
support for this spreading of risks in Congress's response to the
decision in General Electric v. Gilbert."3 The Gilbert Court held
that omission of pregnancy benefits from an employer-provided
disability plan did not violate Title VII. Congress subsequently
amended Title VII to include pregnancy related disabilities in
benefit plans."4 The Spirt Court interpreted this amendment as
an indication of congressional intent to grant equal benefits to
individuals without regard to sexual classification. Pregnancy
benefits increase costs to the employer, not unlike equal pension
benefits to women.
The Court of Appeals correctly decided Spirt.5 A defined
contribution plan based on gender is equally disadvantageous to
women as the defined benefit plan in Manhart, and equally vio-
lative of Title VII. The annuity plans provided in Peters, Spirt,
and Manhart represent compulsory insurance plans that dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. Spirt should be upheld; Peters
should be reversed.
Norris involved an Arizona plan96 that permitted state
691 F.2d at 1062.
92. Id.
93. 429 U.S. 126 (1976). "In Gilbert the Supreme Court held that an employer's
disability benefits plan that failed to provide coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities
did not discriminate against women in violation of Title VII. Congress quickly responded
to this decision by adding 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) to Title VII." Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1062.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) provides in part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not lim-
ited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes,
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980).
95. The court's action here concluded litigation which had continued for more than
eight years. See generally Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1058-60. TIAA and CREF had made several
attempts to negotiate plans that would satisfy the requirements of EEOC and the New
York State Superintendent of Insurance.
96. Involvement of a state in discriminatory practices raises constitutional ques-
tions. Plaintiff Norris originally alleged both a violation of Title VII and the fourteenth
amendment. The District Court could have decided on the basis of Title VII only, with-
out reaching the question of fourteenth amendment liability. Nevertheless, the court
found:
From the facts agreed upon, it is clear that this classification was not made by
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employees to save taxes by deferring a portion of their wages.
The plan was voluntary and involved no employer contribu-
tions.17 However, fewer than 5% of state employees availed
themselves of this opportunity which was supplemental to the
State's general pension plan.98 Under the Arizona plan, employ-
ees who chose to participate were allowed to select from three
options for collection of deferred compensation, only one of
which treated men and women differently. Participating employ-
ees, by exercising personal choice in determining how they col-
lected their savings,99 could elect these options at the time of
the defendants but rather are [sic] the results [sic] of the insurers' judgment.
This is somewhat less than the purposeful invidious gender-based discrimina-
tion necessary for a finding that the compensation plan violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Norris, 486 F. Supp. at 651 (D. Ariz. 1980).
The Court of Appeals did not address the issue of defendant's liability under the
fourteenth amendment, simply noting the trial court's finding that the plan was not
intentionally discriminatory. The court's characterization of Arizona's plan as noninten-
tional for fourteenth amendment purposes does not readily reconcile with its characteri-
zation of the plan as facially discriminatory, and hence intentional, for Title VII pur-
poses. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Title VII and the fourteenth
amendment do not have identical application. In the latter, official actions will be enti-
tled to greater deference than in the former. Nonetheless, the Court has applied the
same standards in nearly identical situations-General Elec. v. Gilbert 429 U.S. 125
(1976) (Title VII) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (fourteenth amendment),
which fell under a disparate impact analysis. Where a disparate treatment analysis is
used, intent is the critical element. Intent is also the critical element in equal protection
violations. Where, as in Norris, a governmental action has been found to be discrimina-
tory on its face and therefore intentional for Title VII purposes, but nonintentional for
equal protection purposes, the Court is faced with either refining its definition, finding
the lower court in error, or remanding to the lower court for further analysis of the con-
stitutional questions. The Court could, of course, avoid these issues by finding that Ari-
zona has not violated Title VII.
Arizona asserts a tenth amendment defense, arguing that because the lower courts
found no fourteenth amendment violation, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) denies Congress power to invoke Title VII against a state. Appellants' Open-
ing Brief at 9, Norris v. Ariz. Governing Comm., 671 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
referred to as Norris Appellants' Brief]. The Court may decide Norris on federalism
grounds; however, resolution of the constitutional issues is not necessary to the conclu-
sion of this Comment-that Norris does not violate Title VII and should be reversed.
97. Arizona specifically forbids state contributions to deferred compensation plans.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-871(C)(1) (1974).
98. "Arizona has an entirely separate and independent state retirement plan. The
retirement plan is mandatory, and contributions and benefits are equal for similarly situ-
ated males." Norris Appellants' Brief, supra note 96, at 6 n.3 (citations omitted). Ari-
zona employs approximately 35,000 employees. "As of August 18, 1978, there were 1,675
employees participating in the plan, of whom 681 were women." Id. at 6. Had Arizona
supplemented women's annuity costs, it would have been providing additional compen-
sation only to the women who could afford to defer wages.
99. At the time plaintiff becomes eligible to receive benefits some years from
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retirement.
Under the first option, an employee could collect in a lump
sum the total amount of his savings plus accumulated interest.'00
Second, an employee could elect to take his total savings in
monthly payments over a set number of years-calculated to
give a complete return of his earnings. Third, an employee could
select a lifetime annuity from several plans offered by indepen-
dent companies selected by the Arizona Governing Commit-
tee.'01 The Ninth Circuit court found that this third option vio-
lated Title VII because the annuities provided larger monthly
sums to men than to women.
Arizona asserted that it offered an option consistent with
the Manhart "open market" proviso, allowing its employees to
accept full wages or to defer a portion to purchase a contract
with a private insurer. The state further argued that it did not
operate the plan, but instead contracted with private companies.
No gender-neutral plans were available from private insurers.'0 2
The Norris Court found the voluntary tax deferral a "privi-
lege" of employment and a "fringe benefit,"'03 bringing it under
the provisions of Title VII. Furthermore, the court found the
provision of options did not meet equal treatment standards,
now, she can then make an entirely different election as to the form in which
she would like to receive her benefits. Regardless of the form of payment she
chooses, her benefits will be calculated on the basis of the accumulated cash
reserve of all of her contributions together with any earnings thereon. Depend-
ing upon plaintiff's estimate of her longevity, retirement needs, and other con-
siderations, plaintiff can elect options . ..
Norris Appellants' Brief, supra note 96, at 9-10 (citations omitted).
100. This option could be considered equal in value to the third option, making the
latter unnecessary. Employees could have used the lump sum to purchase an individual
annuity just as they do in the third option. However, selection of the first option par-
tially defeated the tax advantage because it was not an approved plan subject to "roll
over" provisions of Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 401. Insurance Council Brief,
supra note 12, at 20 n.31.
101. Plaintiff Norris contends that the Committee's selection of companies did not
provide freedom of choice. Further, Norris disputes the state's contention that no insur-
ance companies offer gender neutral annuity plans, (Brief for Plaintiff, Norris v. Ariz.
Governing Comm., 786 F. Supp. 645 (D. Ariz. 1980)) but offers no evidence to the
contrary.
102. "Accordingly, if the State of Arizona is to make available to its employees the
option of receiving their deferred income in the form of a life annuity, it has no choice
but to offer one of the type complained of by plaintiff." Norris Appellants' Brief, supra
note 96, at 2.
103. Norris, 671 F.2d at 333. Title VII makes it unlawful "to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Manhart was based on discrimination in com-
pensation. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 712 n.23.
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where one of the options favored one class over another. "In this
case, Arizona did not merely refuse to provide an annuity plan
to women which treated them equally. It affirmatively offered a
plan, better than that available for purchase by an individual,
which discriminated against women.
10 4
Factual differences between Norris and Manhart do not
support a Title VII violation in Norris. A major distinction
between Norris and the three earlier cases, Manhart, Peters and
Spirt, is the completely voluntary nature of the plan. Because
there is no employer contribution, an employee is not foregoing
wages by her nonparticipation. She is simply participating in her
own personal savings account. The plan cannot be considered
unequal compensation because a woman has the option of not
joining and receiving her "entire compensation each pay day.'
0 5
The "privilege of employment" represented by the deferred
compensation plan is the opportunity to participate, and there is
no allegation that the options are not equally available to men
and women. This is not a fringe benefit within the meaning of
Title VII since a participating employee receives no economic
interest contributed from the employer. Each individual
employee is free to select the plan most advantageous to him or
her-or to invest his or her salary in the private market. This
fits the "open market" exception invited by Manhart.
Arizona's plan does not violate Title VII. The state is
merely acting as a broker'0 6 for its employees, allowing them to
benefit from the tax advantage of deferred compensation in the
only way available. It is only when an employee chooses to
purchase an annuity from a private insurer that a distinction on
the basis of sex exists. An employee in Norris is exercising indi-
vidual choice in the purchase of insurance protection and is free
to select on the basis of perceived benefit. This freedom to select
justifies the use of sex based mortality tables.
104. Norris, 671 F.2d at 335. The court's reference to a "better plan" is based on the
tax advantage inherent in the third option as opposed to the first. See supra note 100.
105. Norris, 671 F.2d at 333.
106. In a related case involving a private college and TIAA-CREF, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Colby College "is more than a broker, or other intermediary,
that enables the parties to enter into the arrangement." EEOC v. Colby College, 589
F.2d 1139, 1141 (1st Cir. 1978). Norris differs from that case in that Colby required all
employees to join the plan; Colby set the contribution rate, and Colby contributed a set
amount to the plan.
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V. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Many of the same arguments aimed at the use of sex-based
tables in employer group plans are advanced against the use of
sex-based tables in individually purchased plans. FIPA107 relies
on these arguments to outlaw all insurance distinctions based on
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The policy argu-
ments for prohibiting use of sex as a risk predictor fall under
four major headings: overlap, women's needs, invalidity of data,
and civil rights principles.
The fact that the ages of most men and women are equal at
death is referred to as "overlap. ' '108 The Senate Committee
Report on FIPA noted statistics showing that 86% of the women
in one group had the same death age as 86% of the men. 109 This
overlap is a statistical inevitability.1 0 No factor for predicting
death will show a 100% correlation. All smokers do not prede-
cease all nonsmokers. All obese persons do not predecease all
thin persons. There is, however, a statistical correlation between
smoking and body weight, and health and longevity, which an
insurer can use in assigning risks.
The Senate Committee Report quoted testimony on disad-
vantages to women as they increasingly enter the workforce, and
107. S. 2204, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982) (reintroduced in 1983 as S. 372, sponsored
by Oregon Senators Hatfield and Packwood and South Carolina Senator Hollings, and
H.R. 100, sponsored by Michigan Congressman Dingell) provides in part:
2(b) The Congress therefore declares that it is the policy of the United States
that no insurer shall, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of any individual or group of persons, (1) refuse to make insurance avail-
able to any applicant for insurance, (2) with respect to insurance contracts to
which this Act applies, treat any such applicant or insured differently than any
other applicant or insured with respect to the terms, conditions, rates, benefits,
or requirements of any such insurance contract ...
108. While the actuarial tables indicate that the average sixty-five year-old
man will die at age eighty-two and the average sixty-five year-old woman will
die at age eighty-six, individual statistics will show that eighty-four percent of
the females will actually die at the same age as their male counterparts. The
greater average life expectancy of females may be accounted for by the sixteen
percent of the women and the sixteen percent of the men whose death ages do
not match. . . .Classification by sex places a significant number of people into
the wrong risk grouping, and is therefore unfair to those individuals.
DUKE L.J. supra note 6, at 682 (footnotes omitted). Compare supra note 87.
109. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
110. The 14% of lives that do not overlap is a measure of the statistical correlation
between male and female life expectancy. For example, in Manhart the additional
monthly contribution required from women was 14.84%, consistent with the mortality
that did not overlap. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 705.
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as they increasingly find themselves heads of households.' It is
impossible to argue with assertions that women's need for
income in old age is fully as great as men's.112 But it is not the
role of insurance to recognize this need by shifting the costs to
men. If need is the criterion, the healthy person should subsidize
the life insurance costs of the person in ill health-the needs of
their families are the same. The basic concept of insurance is
that premiums will be matched to risks to the extent practica-
ble; otherwise everyone would pay the same premium.' Tying
the cost of insurance to need denies this goal and fails to recog-
nize the economic effect of adverse selection.
While the Senate Committee Report does not directly con-
tradict data indicating greater life expectancies for women than
men, it questions the relevancy of the data by pointing to social
and economic reasons for the distinctions. The Report asserts
that race is an equally significant predictor as sex, but is not
used by the insurance industry."' Race, however, is outlawed as
a factor in many states.1 5 Additionally, race is less reliable. The
fact that an individual can have a multiracial heritage makes
race an unstable factor.116
111. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
112. Whatever the economic rationale for the differences in treatment of male/
female pensioners and male/female life insureds, social justice demands that
they be treated equally. . . . The survivors who receive a man's life insurance
benefits when he dies have the same needs as the survivors of a woman, but
there is less money for those needs. Mutual subsidization through a unisex
mortality table is one way of providing equally for these individuals. This is
essentially an income redistribution approach to economic inequality based on
sex, designed to speed the changes in society that the Equal Pay Act, Title VII
and the Equal Rights Amendment were intended to bring about.
Note, Sex Discrimination and Sex-Based Mortality Tables, 53 B.U.L. REv. 624, 653
(1973).
113. "In general, economic incentive operates over time to favor classification sys-
tems that result in a price for each risk which most nearly equals the expected cost
associated with the class to which that risk is assigned." RISK CLASSIFICATION, supra note
17, at 10. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
114. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
115. Manhart noted that some states have outlawed higher life insurance rates for
blacks since the nineteenth century. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709 n.16. This would at least
partially explain why race is not used as a predictor.
116. The use of race as a classifier is generally repugnant because of this nation's
sorry history in discriminating against racial minorities. This Comment, however, con-
tends that discrimination issues are not the same in an insurance context. See supra
notes 32-41 and accompanying text. There are clear countervailing advantages in insur-
ance rates tailored to group statistics. If blacks were charged more for life insurance
(where their group experience indicates shorter life), they should be charged less for
annuities. Benston, supra note 6, at 512, contends race is inherently as fair as sex as a
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The Report points to the fact that religion is also a signifi-
cant predictor of longevity, but is not used by insurance compa-
nies. The Report apparently infers that since insurance compa-
nies do not use race or religion as predictors, they can also
dispense with sex as a predictor. The bill recommended by the
Committee would prohibit the use of race, sex, and religion as
factors in calculating insurance premiums or disbursements.
A number of commentators have attacked and counter-
attacked on the significance of the data on women's life expec-
tancy." 7 None has satisfactorily explained why insurers use the
predictor.
If the goal is avoiding unfair discrimination against individuals with respect to
insurance, all traits associated with a person should be used to estimate the
risk that the insured-against event will occur to that person. For example, if
sickle cell anemia increases the risk of death, and if it is found only in blacks,
and if there is no efficient way to determine which particular black individuals
have or are likely to get this disease, but it can readily be determined who is
black, then the additional risk should be accounted for. If this is not done for
annuities, blacks would not only have an immutably greater risk of death, but
they would not be compensated for this risk.
Id. Kimball, supra note 6, points out the unreliability of race as a predictor.
[T]here are problems in the use of race as a class for ratemaking that are not
duplicated in the use of sex. One intractable problem is the determination of
race. No race is "pure," and certainly not in America. Some unknown percent-
age of the "white" population of this country has genes from black ancestors.
Much more important, a large percentage of the "black" population would by
any rational classification be considered white. . . .For annuities . . . there is
evidence that those nonwhites ...who reach the retirement ages have life
expectancies closely comparable to corresponding whites.
Id. at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).
117. See supra note 1. But see Brilmayer, supra note 4. Brilmayer argues against
the reliability of gender-based mortality tables, contending socioeconomic factors con-
tribute to any observed distinctions in mortality, and these factors are changing. Contra
Benston, supra note 6. Benston disputes the validity of Brilmayer's arguments with sta-
tistical data. He concludes that insurers have no reason to discriminate unfairly, and, in
fact, have an economic incentive to use only accurate predictors. Id. at 529. See also
Kimball, supra note 6. The Court in Manhart speculated that women's changing lifes-
tyles would tend to even out the disparity in male and female longevity. Manhart, 435
U.S. at 709-10 & 710 n.17. The reverse is occurring. Despite women's increased smoking
and increased involvement in the working world, the gap is widening. See supra note 1.
Figures show an overall decline in cigarette smokers as a percentage of both male and
female adults since 1964. The ratio of women smokers to male smokers has, however,
increased. In 1964 the ratio of men to women smokers was 168%. In 1975 it had declined
to 136%. SMOKING AND HEALTH-A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. HEW,
DHEW PUB. No. PHS (79-50066) (1979). Women as a percentage of the work force aged
10 and over has increased from 18% in 1900 to 52.2% in 1981. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S., COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 (1960), and Statis-
tical Abstract. Judge Atteburn, in a concurring opinion in Reilly v. Robertson, 360
N.E.2d 171, 181 (Ind. 1977), ascribed women's greater longevity to the fact that "tradi-
tionally men engage in more hazardous or stressful occupations (such as mining, steel
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data if it is not reliable. If changing social and economic factors
are reflected in new statistics, insurers will find it economically
advantageous to use them.
The Report asserts that individuals should not be judged by
group characteristics. ' 8 Because sex, like race, color, religion, or
national origin, is an immutable characteristic, civil rights prin-
ciples dictate against its use to disadvantage individuals. The
Report fails to explain why its suggested criteria of weight,
build, physical condition, personal and family history, or marital
or socioeconomic status" 9 are any more fair. Many of these fac-
tors have often been used as a basis for discrimination. 20 Physi-
cal condition and family history may be equally as immutable as
sex.' 21
Congress can, of course, determine as a national policy that
some classifications should not be used, regardless of their sta-
tistical accuracy. But the usual antidiscrimination criteria and
goals do not apply to insurance. 2 Limiting risk classifications
serves no legitimate governmental purpose other than forcing
the better risks to subsidize the poorer. At some point, the pro-
cess of adverse selection would dictate self-insurance for the bet-
ter risks. The poorer risks would remain in the pool, and their
construction) while many women are engaged in household activities." However, this
assumption is not borne out by general experience, and statistics from the teaching pro-
fession (the workforce being addressed in Reilly) indicate no such correlation. The expe-
rience of California teachers shows a widening gap similar to that for the nation as a
whole. "On the average male mortality rates have decreased at 1.7 % per year and female
rates at 2.1 % per year." W. Smith, Mortality Differences by Sex for California Teachers
(1983) (unpublished paper available in University of Puget Sound Law Review office).
Given these facts, mortality tables based on experience within a profession (as suggested
by Judge Atteburn) would yield the same results-that women generally live longer than
men.
118. "This 'separate but equal' treatment [by the insurance industry] results in per-
sons being evaluated within the context of their sex first, rather than being evaluated on
their own personal characteristics." SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 5.
119. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 15.
120. Congress has recognized that employment discrimination occurs on the basis of
physical handicap (Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976)); on the basis of age (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976)); and on the basis of marital
status (Merit System Principles, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(e) (Supp. V 1981)). Yet insurance
distinctions on these bases are allowed in FIPA.
121. "[N]one of the witnesses [before the Senate Committee] ever explained why
immutability should be a factor in actuarial decisions. People also can't control their
genetic heritage. If you're born with some life-threatening genetic defect, should you get
insurance at the same price as someone who's in normal health?" Seligman, Insurance
and the Price of Sex, FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 1983, at 84.
122. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
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costs would rise to match their experience."'
Insurance is unique. The only way in which it can be indi-
vidualized is to take into account group expectations as applied
to an individual. 24 Where a free market exists, insurers will
compete to find accurate predictors. There is no economic incen-
tive to discriminate with inaccurate predictors. Because of the
mandatory nature of employer-provided group insurance, fair-
ness in an employment context dictates against sex-based tables.
In individually purchased insurance, however, fairness dictates
the matching of costs and benefits to individual risk characteris-
tics, including sex. 1
25
Employers have not been required to make drastic changes
in the aftermath of Manhart. Because the Court refused to
enforce back payments, the effect has been to require prospec-
tive application of unisex tables in defined benefit plans oper-
ated by employers. Nonetheless, confusion exists as to whether
defined contribution plans fall under Title VII's prohibition and
whether insurance retirement plan options, such as cashouts and
joint and survivor, should be gender-neutral.
Even if the Court decides Peters, Spirt, and Norris as advo-
cated in this article, unresolved issues will remain. Employers,
not knowing the legal guidelines for cashout plans and joint and
life survivor options, could face large financial risks. It is not
clear whether cashouts should be based on actuarial
equivalencies (greater value for women) as advocated by some,
or on a gender-neutral basis. Nor is it clear whether joint and
survivor options should take into account the sex of the non-
employee spouse.
123. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
124. All insurance premiums are based on some type of discrimination, and
without which classifications, all policyholders would pay the same rate regard-
less of their risk. . . . [I]f the bill should pass, women would have to pay more
for auto insurance, even though they cause fewer losses, and more for life
insurance although they live longer than men and today pay a commensurately
lower premium over a longer period.
Proposed Law Would End Insurance Sex Rate Bias, 68 A.B.A. J. 1350, 1351 (1982)
(attributing remarks to George Bernstein, lawyer for the American Insurance Associa-
tion). On the other side, "The overall impact of insurance discrimination on women is
negative. Women who need health or disability coverage must pay more for less protec-
tion." Id. (quoting Judy Schub, director of legislation and program development for the
National Federation of Business and Professional Clubs). Id. at 1351.
125. See Minority Views of Senator Goldwater, SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 26,
on the fairness of insurance access and calculations. The Senator notes that state laws
generally require that any distinctions in insurance rates must be statistically valid.
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FIPA would resolve these questions by forbidding the use of
sex-segregated tables for any insurance policy. But it reaches too
far by extending Title VII principles to the private market. As a
resolution, Congress should mandate gender-neutral disburse-
ment of funds to employees in all employer-contribution plans.
Such legislation would require the same cashout rates for men as
women. Requiring equal cashout rates closely approximates the
open market. It should be noted that nothing in the law requires
cashouts which are more attractive than retention of annuity
benefits. Under this proposal, an employer would be free to
design options which encourage retention. The insurance indus-
try should be free to design competitive policies that reflect indi-
vidual risk predictors. An individual should be free to negotiate
a policy which reflects his personal risk factors, sex being one of
those factors. An open market constitutes the fairest way of pro-
viding individual insurance tailored to individual characteristics.
VI. CONCLUSION
Manhart was correctly decided and its principles should be
extended to retirement plans in Peters, Spirt, and Norris. Fur-
ther, the principles of Manhart should be extended into the leg-
islative realm as Congress attempts to define fairness in an
insurance context. FIPA, which would prohibit sex discrimina-
tion in all insurance coverage, should not be passed. It prohibits
choice in private insurance and prevents individualization in the
only manner possible-predictions based on group experience.
Congress should instead adopt legislation which would prohibit
any distinctions on the basis of sex in disbursements under an
employer-contribution plan and leave individual insurance to
the competitive market.
Cheryl Bleakney
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